Narrative as a Weapon: Threat Approaches to Cognitive WarfarNarrative as a Weapon: Russian, Iranian, and Chinese Approaches to Cognitive Warfare Image

Curator note

The Social Design Agency (SDA), a Kremlin-linked agent, executed a significant influence operation known as Operation Doppelgänger from 2022 to https://www.psychologicaldefence.lu.se/sites/psychologicaldefence.lu.se/files/2025-05/Beyond%20Operation%20Doppelg%C3%A4nger.pdf. Through Doppelgänger, the SDA disseminated pro-Russian narratives by fabricating legitimate news websites, and amplified the content through fake social media personas and https://www.psychologicaldefence.lu.se/sites/psychologicaldefence.lu.se/files/2025-05/Beyond%20Operation%20Doppelg%C3%A4nger.pdf. Doppelgänger’s significance, however, emanated from its secondary effects. While Western governments effectively responded to the crisis and contained the disinformation, the operation remained in the new cycle as news people ruminated and politicians securitized the issue. Russia’s success was found in this amplification; Russia framed and controlled the narrative and normalized Russian penetration of the cognitive https://www.psychologicaldefence.lu.se/sites/psychologicaldefence.lu.se/files/2025-05/Beyond%20Operation%20Doppelg%C3%A4nger.pdf.Adversarial states such as Russia, Iran, and China seek to modify the balance of power internationally and recognize cognitive warfare’s role in achieving state interests in a subversive era. Russia, Iran, and China employ cognitive warfare to pursue power and influence at Western https://www.amazon.co.uk/Three-Dangerous-Men-Irregular-Warfare/dp/132405056X. These regimes use weaponized narratives domestically to suppress domestic dissent, and abroad to advance state interests by shaping and changing human behavior. Given recent developments in the Middle East, understanding cognitive warfare’s role in conflict and statecraft is vital. This article seeks to provide a priming analysis of the similarities and differences between Russian, China, and Iranian cognitive warfare and clarify the central role that narrative plays in manipulating human behavior. This article explores how Russia and Iran produce well-built influence campaigns targeting Western societies, while China uses disinformation and influence activities successfully to promote pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/04/how-would-china-weaponize-disinformation-against-taiwan.html. Additionally, this essay explores how each regime controls domestic information, Russian and Iranian covert media influence, and China’s global network of media and security services. Finally, this article identifies several key areas Iran has exploited in the information environment during the ongoing conflict.